Hebrews 11.1?

This is a characterization of faith. Is it a definition as well? Not every characterization of a thing is a definition of it. E.g., when I say that grass is green and eaten by cows, I am accurately describing grass, but not defining it.

The verse in the RSV reads:

Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

Is the first part:

“the assurance of things hoped for"

equivalent to, “being sure of what I hope for?”

If it is, then it seems paradoxical: If I am sure, then I am not hoping. If I am hoping, then I am not sure.

(Consider the difference between wishing, hoping, and believing: I don't need any evidence in order to wish for something. I have not bought a lottery ticket, but I can still wish I were going to win, even though I know I can't. In contrast, to hope requires that I have some evidence, at least enough to believe what I hope for is possible. If I have bought a ticket in the lottery, then I can hope that I win, even if the odds against against my winning are very long. However, when I see that my number has been drawn and I get the official notification from the state lottery commission, I now believe--I'm sure--that I have won, and I no longer hope that I have won. So combining being sure with hoping is surprising.)

How about

“the conviction of things not seen...”

First: should the “not seen” be taken literally, or as a way to say “things not observed?”

Well, I am convinced that sound exists even though I cannot see it. I shouldn't say--should I?--that I have faith that there is sound coming out of my mouth. I just hear it. Defining faith as belief in the invisible seems to include far too much.

But reading "things not seen" as "things not observed" still seems to include way too much. There are lots of things I cannot see, hear, smell, feel, or taste that I believe exist but that belief is not a matter of faith. E.g., I cannot observe atoms or radio waves but my belief that there are such things is not a matter of faith. Defining faith as belief in the unobservable still seems to include far too much.

But then, should we understand “things not seen” as things for which we lack justification? The problem with this for some of us that it guarantees that faith is unreasonable.

So none of these options seem plausible to me:

I A person has faith = she has a belief in something she cannot see

II A person has faith = she has a belief in something she cannot observe

III A person has faith = she has a belief that she cannot justify

The author of the epsitle to the Hebrews must have had something more interesting in mind!

Faith and Reason?

We have beliefs, and we have good reasons (justification) for at least some of them. We also have faith, and one of the persistent questions of the philosophy of religion is:


What is the relation of faith and reason?

However, before we can get anywhere answering that question, we should try to define faith. How, at least initially, would you define faith?

Practical Epistemology

Three Epistemological Principles

Childhood Credulity

A normal human child believes whatever the authority figures in her life teach her, unless and until she encounters reasons not to believe it.

Intellectual Conservatism

If a person already believes something, then it is reasonable for her to continue to believe it, unless and until she encounters reasons not to believe it.

Intellectual Ownership

A person is rational and intellectually responsible only if she has her own good reasons for the important beliefs in terms of which she organizes her life.

Question 1

Is the principle of Intellectual Ownership at odds with the principle of Intellectual Conservatism?

Question 2: Encountering non-belief

A person grows up believing something because the authority figures in her life believe it. She reaches adulthood and learns that many other persons who not (otherwise) appear to be stupid or perverse disbelieve it. What, if anything, should she do about this?

Question 3: Encountering Groundless Authority

A person grows up believing something because the authority figures in her life believe it. She reaches adulthood and realizes that these authority figures acquired their belief in essentially the same way she did, i.e., from the authority figures in their childhoods. She also ascertains that none of their beliefs descend ultimately from anyone who acquired the belief by way of a direct examination of the evidence for and against it. What, if anything, should she do about this?

Question 4: Encountering Grounded Disbelief

A person grows up believing something because the authority figures in her life believe it. She reaches adulthood and learns that many other persons disbelieve it. She also realizes that some of those who disbelieve it appear to be better situated vis-à-vis the evidence to make a judgment on it than the authority figures in her life from whom she acquired the belief. What, if anything, should she do about this?

Question 5: Encountering Undefeated Defeaters

A person’s belief is in accord with the Intellectual Ownership principle. But eventually she discovers that there are persons who disbelieve it and, when she investigates, she discovers that some of them have objections to the reasons she offers for her belief to which she cannot effectively respond. She also finds that some of them offer reasons against her belief that she cannot counter. What, if anything, should she do about this?